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Insiders represent a major threat to the security of an organization’s information resources (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; 
Stanton et al., 2005). Previous research has explored the role of protection motivation or of deterrence in promoting 
compliant behavior, but these factors have not been studied together. Furthermore, other individual differences, such as the 
Big Five personality factors may serve as critical influences on cybersecurity compliance. In this study we use a factorial 
survey approach to identify key components of secure insider behavior. We obtained 201 observations from a diverse sample 
of employees. The results of this effort will enable us to develop psychological profiles of individual employees so that we 
may create personalized cybersecurity training protocols that meet the unique needs of each employee profile, appealing to 
the proper set of motivations for each. Findings of the present study are presented, and the long-term project goal is 
discussed. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity Policy Violation, Protection Motivation Theory, General Deterrence Theory, Personality. 
Note: This study is being funded in part by a grant from the Institute of Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS) as part of their 
Cyber Security Test Bed project.  IHSS is a federally funded collaborative initiative which coordinates its research activities 
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division. 
INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining the security of information systems has become a critical objective because of the very significant losses that 
result from the intentional, and sometimes malicious, behaviors and actions of insiders (employees).  Recent industry reports 
confirm academic reports that insider abuse is a large and growing concern for organizations, especially during these 
recessionary times when disgruntled workers engage in various improper acts.  Technical controls are ineffective at 
preventing motivated insiders from performing various forms of insider abuse, thus organizations employ a range of 
behavioral controls, including security education, training, and awareness (SETA) campaigns (Peltier, 2005), appeals to 
protection motivation (Johnson and Warkentin, 2010), and reminders about formal sanctions against IS security violations 
(D’Arcy, et al. 2009).  Accordingly, academic research has investigated the success of these efforts, but not in relation to each 
other.  (Studies have investigated deterrence (sanctions) or protection motivation theory (PMT), but not both together.)  
Furthermore, we have learned (from Shropshire, et al., 2006, and others) that individual differences, such as personality traits, 
may be responsible for promoting or encouraging “bad behavior” by certain employees.  Which is more important?  How do 
they interact?  What can we learn about how various individual employees might react to various points of leverage or 
various attitude drivers? 
Insider abuse, which occurs when employees violate cybersecurity policies, is frequently identified as the greatest single 
source of threat to organizational information systems security (Warkentin & Willison, 2009; Boss et al, 2009).  The actions 
and behaviors of employees may be accidental, volitional (but not malicious), or malicious (Willison & Warkentin, 2012).  
According to the results of a recent survey administered to 443 information security and information technology 
professionals, “twenty-five percent of respondents felt that over 60 percent of their organizations’ financial losses were due to 
non-malicious actions by insiders (Richardson, 2009).” Forty-three percent of respondents stated that “at least some of their 
losses were attributable to malicious insiders (Richardson, 2009).”  Insiders not only have access to the information and 
applications (i.e., they are behind the firewall with valid usernames and passwords), they also have intimate knowledge about 
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organizational procedures and weaknesses which makes employees supremely situated to take advantage of security 
vulnerabilities. 
The existing literature identifies numerous factors that encourage individuals to either comply with or violate cybersecurity 
policies (Dhillon and Backhouse 2000).  Straub and Welke (1998) established the Security Action Cycle, which identifies the 
sequential roles of deterrence, prevention, detection, and remediation in minimizing insider abuse.  This framework has 
formed the foundation of a rich stream of subsequent research and has been augmented by the Extended Security Action 
Cycle (Willison & Warkentin, 2010; 2012).  In this framework, organizations can look even further back in time to identify 
factors that may motivate individual employees to commit acts of internal computer abuse, such as disgruntlement resulting 
from perceived organizational injustice (Willison & Warkentin, 2010), and the techniques of neutralization (Siponen & 
Vance, 2010).  It has also been shown that, in considering potential acts, some individuals are more responsive to their sense 
of morality (Siponen & Vance, 2010) and other individuals are more likely to engage in a somewhat rational assessment of 
the relative benefits and costs of policy violations by evaluating the potential sanctions for violating policies (Bulgurcu et al., 
2010; Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
In terms of influencing individual employee behavior, there are two primary vectors routinely utilized to influence employee 
behavior in the workplace.  The first is training, often called “Security Education Training & Awareness” or SETA programs. 
Another vector frequently utilized to influence cybersecurity behavior in the workplace is composed of various organizational 
communications designed to influence employee behavior (e.g. “fear appeals” (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010)).   
We suggest that cybersecurity training protocols should be contingent on individual differences, rather than a “one size fits 
all” approach. In the present study, we seek to identify the individual differences that are germane and then identify their 
relationship with policy compliance intentions.  One individual difference of importance is personality type, which is 
relatively stable over each person’s lifetime.  Though personality differences cannot be altered through intervention, they can 
be used to establish empirically-tested employee selection and training contingency assignments.  In other words, if we can 
establish statistically significant relationships between individual differences (such as various personality profiles) and 
compliance intention motivations, we can create guidelines for authoring various training protocols that are customized to 
meet the unique needs of diverse cybersecurity users within the workplace, and which will be more effective at influencing 
the behavior of the trainees. 
Although research on cybersecurity policy compliance has expanded in the last few years, there are still gaps in the literature.  
For instance, the literature that identifies linkages between individual differences and compliance intention has not been 
integrated into a single model, nor have the various dimensions of individuals been thoroughly explored.  In addition, 
according to Puhakainen et al. (2010), few security compliance studies empirically explore the role of training and 
compliance.  Bulgurcu et al. (2010) highlight the need for additional empirical research on information security awareness 
education and training.  Puhakainen et al. (2010) state “when the aim is to motivate cognitive – and avoid superficial – 
processing of information, IS security policy compliance training should use learning tasks that are personally relevant to the 
learners.”   This study is designed to identify which individual characteristics have a significant impact on cybersecurity 
behaviors in order to develop such personally-relevant cybersecurity learning tasks.  
Appropriate cybersecurity education programs, especially within the workplace, should be based on an informed deep 
understanding of the relationships between individual employee psychological profiles and training protocols.  Our research 
is designed to provide such knowledge.  In this study, we will develop and empirically validate a comprehensive, yet 
parsimonious, model of cybersecurity compliance intentions which will be used to construct tailored cybersecurity training 
protocols.  Identifying the factors that motivate compliance among diverse sectors within the workplace has implications for 
employee selection, assignment (e.g., to specific departments and project teams), and training.  Ultimately, this research is 
designed to identify individual differences (in threat perceptions, sanctions, and other factors), develop psychological profiles 
which can be used to categorize all employees (including those who may pose an insider threat), construct training protocols 
that can be used to improve workforce cybersecurity practices, and establish a foundation for the development of customized 
cybersecurity training modules. Future research includes the adaptation of these protocols into training modules that can be 
implemented and tested for efficacy. 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
What has the extant research taught us about insider abuse?  Recent research, found largely within the Management 
Information Systems (MIS) research community and supported by theories found in social psychology, criminology, and 
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other related disciplines, has identified a number of factors that influence individuals to either comply with or violate policies 
regarding cybersecurity.  Extant literature has identified various organizational tools used to combat insider abuse, such as 
deterrence, prevention, detection, and remediation (Straub and Welke, 1998), managerial communications (Johnston and 
Warkentin, 2010), and other techniques which can be used to motivate compliance with cyber security practices  On the other 
hand, perceived feelings of organizational injustice are likely to provoke individual employees to commit acts of internal 
computer abuse (Willison & Warkentin, 2010), and techniques of neutralization (Siponen and Vance, 2010) are used by 
employees to rationalize their volitional noncompliant behaviors  Some individual-level factors, especially attitudes and 
intentions, can be influenced by organizational actions, such as sanctions, rewards, or Security Education, Training, and 
Awareness (SETA) campaigns (Hollinger  and Clark 1982; Puhakainen & Siponen, 2010).  Other individual differences are 
relatively static and cannot be easily influenced, such as morality, gender, and ethnicity.  Sanctions (both formal and 
informal) are found to have an impact in certain circumstances, but only when employees evaluate potential behaviors from a 
rational choice (cost-benefit) point of view. 
One individual difference of particular importance is personality type, which is relatively stable over each person’s lifetime 
(Conley, 1985).  Though personality differences cannot be altered through intervention, they can be used to establish 
empirically-tested employee selection and training contingency assignments.  In other words, if we can establish statistically 
significant relationships between individual differences (such as various personality profiles) and compliance intention 
motivations, we can establish the guidelines for authoring various training protocols customized to meet the unique needs of 
diverse cybersecurity users within the workplace.  
One of the common personality assessments used in IS literature is the “Big Five” personality test (Buchanan et al., 2005; 
Engelberg & Sjöberg, 2004; Karim et al., 2009; Landers & Lounsbury, 2006; Lim & Benbasat, 2000; Major et al., 2006; 
Shropshire et al., 2006; Swickert, 2002).  The five personality traits measured in this test are listed in Table 1.  Initial 
investigations have established linkages between the Big Five personality traits and cybersecurity compliance behaviors 
(Shropshire et al., 2006).  For instance, preliminary investigations have established that the traits of conscientiousness and 
agreeableness may be strongly linked with an individual employee’s intention to comply with cybersecurity policies and to 
adopt protective technologies (Major et al., 2006; Shropshire et al., 2006).  However, other Big Five traits such as openness, 
along with individual differences such as the rationality of individual decision making; the degree of alignment with the 
organization’s goals; cultural factors; or how much an individual may react to emotional appeals (e.g., fear appeals), 
sanctions, or rewards may also prove to be instrumental in establishing a profile that is associated with the motivation to 
comply with cybersecurity policies.  
 
Big Five Trait Trait Description (Zhang 2006) 
Neuroticism “People [scoring] high on the [neuroticism] scale tend to experience such negative 
feelings as emotional instability, embarrassment, guilt, pessimism, and low self-
esteem” 
Extraversion “People scoring high on the extraversion scale tend to be sociable and assertive, 
and they prefer to work with other people.” 
Openness to experience “[People scoring high on the openness scale are] characterized by such attributes 
as open-mindedness, active imagination, preference for variety, and independence 
of judgment.” 
Agreeableness “People [scoring] high on the agreeableness scale tend to be tolerant, trusting, 
accepting, and they value and respect other people’s beliefs and conventions.” 
Conscientiousness “People [scoring] high on the conscientiousness scale tend to distinguish 
themselves for their trustworthiness and their sense of purposefulness and of 
responsibility. They tend to be strong-willed, task-focused, and achievement-
oriented.” 
Table 1: Big Five Personality Trait Descriptions 
 
We seek to understand the role of individual differences, such as the “Big Five” personality traits, on cybersecurity 
compliance (John & Srivaastava, 1999).  One such individual difference is the degree to which each individual is influenced 
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by sanctions (Boss et al. 2009; D’Arcy et al 2008; Herath and Rao 2009).  Deterrence theory (Akers, 1990; Ehrlich, 1996) 
suggests that individuals will be deterred from performing undesirable behavior (e.g. crime, computer abuse, policy 
violation) if they perceive that there will be punishments or sanctions which are certain, severe, and swift.  But such 
deterrence has a differential effect on individuals due to their relative morality and rationality.  The effective application of 
deterrence controls presumes that individuals consider the benefits of a policy violation (e.g. convenience of temporarily 
leaving a workstation without logging off, selecting a weak password that is easy to remember, avoiding proper patch 
management, or breaking into a database to steal valuable information) and the costs of such violations (perceived sanction 
certainty, severity, and celerity (swiftness)), and make a rational choice to engage in noncompliant or criminal behavior).  So 
SETA programs can inform employees about sanctions, but individuals will cognitively process that information in unique 
ways.  Another important individual difference addresses one’s inherent nature to protect himself from threats.  Protection 
motivation theory (PMT) suggests that when individuals perceive that they are more susceptible to security threats (such as 
malware or hard drive crashes) and when the threats are more severe, they are more likely to adopt a recommended response 
to the threat (such as scanning for malware or backing up data), as long as the individual employee possesses sufficient self-
efficacy and perceived efficacy in the recommended response (both of which can also be influenced) (Anderson & Agarwal, 
2010; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). 
RESEARCH MODEL 
Why do some employees comply with organizational cybersecurity policies and others do not?  Can these antecedents be 
influenced with training, sanctions, or other interventions?  What can be learned about differences in the way that individuals 
react to sanctions?  Are there certain individual differences, such personality characteristics, which may enable organizations 
to identify the appropriate job candidates to hire in order to match the goals of the organization?  These are the primary 
questions we wish to address in our study.  The model shown in Figure 1 contains the elements which we intend to explore 
during this study.  Preliminary results are presented here, and later findings of our full study will be presented at the 
conference. 
 
Figure 1: The Relative Impact of Protection Motivation, Sanctions, and Personality Traits on Cybersecurity Violation Intention 
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METHOD 
We apply a factorial survey approach to investigate the research questions presented in this study.  The factorial survey 
approach is a variant of the scenario design and, through the use of scenarios, is able to provide contextual detail to decision 
making situations and to evenly distribute these details across all participants in the study.  We obtained 201 usable 
observations from an online sample of 86 individuals who met both of the following conditions: 1) have held a job that 
required the use of a computer and 2) have held a job where employees must follow security procedures.  Following a 
random design factorial survey approach advocated by Rossi and Anderson (1982), each participant was asked to read and 
respond to an online survey that contained four randomly generated hypothetical scenarios, yielding 344 observations at the 
vignette level, of which 143 were removed due to failures in the manipulation checks and the content validity (realism) 
measure.  This resulted in 201 usable observations.  Each scenario described a situation in which a company’s employee, 
named Joe, has collected sensitive customer data for his company and wants to take the data home to continue his work.   
After reading a scenario in which Joe ignores a password encryption procedure and engages in a form of information theft, 
respondents were asked to estimate the chance that they would mirror the employee’s actions under similar conditions.  The 
response options ranged from one to five, with five serving as a “strongly agree” with conducting actions similar to those of 
Joe. Manipulated as part of each scenario is Joe’s perception of perceived threat severity, perceived threat susceptibility, 
perceived self-efficacy, perceived response efficacy, perceived response cost, perceived sanction severity, and perceived 
sanction certainty.  The dependent variable in this study is the respondent’s self-reported intention to perpetrate an act of 
computer abuse (password theft) as described in each scenario. We assessed the Big Five personality traits using a 44-item 5-
point Likert scale (John et al. 2008), capturing the distinct factors of agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
neuroticism, and openness. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Model estimation followed an approach similar to Lyons (2008) and Paternoster and Simpson (1996) in which a “random 
effects” model is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity across respondents, a concern of the factorial survey research 
design.  For the dependent variable, intention to perpetrate computer abuse, the estimated model includes each of the 
dimensions described by PMT as well as the perceived sanction dimensions of perceived sanction severity and perceived 
sanction certainty position as direct antecedents of behavioral intent.  Subsequent models are provided that test for cross-level 
interactions involving the Big 5 personality traits. 
Results 
While the scenarios presented to the participants in the study are in terms of a fictitious character involved in data theft 
scenario, the factorial survey design allows us to draw inferences to respondent behavior if placed in similar situations.  As 
indicated in Table 2, the results of this study suggest that highly severe consequences for unauthorized data access are 
significantly more effective in preventing data theft than less severe consequences.  Similarly, data protection is more likely 
to occur in situations in which the protective act does not take much time to complete (low perceived response cost).  In 
terms of sanctioning, the results indicate that highly severe sanctions are more effective in eliciting protective behavior than 
less severe or certain punishment, while the certainty of the sanctions is non-significant in the determination of protective 
behavior. 
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Reference levels:  high threat severity a; high threat susceptibility b; high self-efficacy c; high response efficacy d; high 
sanction severity e; high sanction certainty f  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
Table 2: Random Intercept Model: Behavioral Intention to Commit Computer Abuse 
 
An examination of the Big 5 personality factors as moderating factors on the relationships forming behavioral intent suggests 
several significant interactions, depicted in Table 3.  The results of this cross-level interaction analysis suggest that 
agreeableness interacts with self-efficacy, such that in their determination of whether to protect sensitive data, more agreeable 
respondents will place more importance on their ability to protect data than less agreeable respondents.  Similarly, compared 
to their less conscientious peers, more conscientious respondents will find the severity and certainty of possible sanctions 
stemming from data theft to be more impactful in the decisions of whether or not to protect sensitive data.  Finally, in terms 
of response costs, highly neurotic and open respondents will look more carefully at the costs associated with performing 
protective acts than their less neurotic or open peers. 
Dimension and Level β S.E. T-Value 
Perceived Threat Severity a  0.108 0.027    3.926*** 
Perceived Threat Susceptibility b  0.062 0.031    1.991 
Perceived Self-Efficacy c  0.002 0.025    0.076 
Perceived Response Efficacy d -0.040 0.025  -1.577 
Perceived Response Cost  0.227 0.066   3.458** 
Perceived Sanction Severity e  0.061 0.029   2.140* 
Perceived Sanction Certainty f  0.036 0.022   1.664 
Intercept  1.014 0.177   5.725*** 
Observations (Vignette Level) N = 201 
Fit Statistic 
AIC =- 529.146 
BIC = -261.578 
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Main Effects Interaction 
Respondent Level β T-Value Scenario  
Level 
β T-Value β T-Value 
Agreeableness -0.282 -3.01** Self-Efficacy -1.132 -2.23**  0.274 2.18** 
Conscientiousness -0.298 -2.91** Sanction Severity -1.249 -2.15**  0.293 2.14** 
Conscientiousness -0.265 -2.56** Sanction Certainty -0.939 -1.62  0.232 1.68* 
Neuroticism -0.292 -1.81* Response Cost  0.359  2.39** 0.129 2.15** 
Openness -0.478 -2.21** Response Cost  0.047  0.171 0.171 2.32** 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05 
Table 3: Cross-level Interactions for Behavioral Intention to Commit Computer Abuse 
 
DISCUSSION  
These initial results confirm that individuals react differently to the same conditions, and imply that the approach we adopt to 
cybersecurity training must also differentiate between individual employee archetypes.  But what are these categories, and 
how can we differentiate between the employees so we can deliver SETA training that is appropriate for each type?  The 
ultimate goal of this study is to assist in the development and evaluation of a comprehensive framework for enhancing 
cybersecurity practices in the business sector.  In particular, we plan to highlight the cybersecurity perceptions and intentions 
of diverse personality types.  By creating a limited set of unique cybersecurity personality profiles, we will be able to develop 
customized training protocols that meet the unique needs of each technology user (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2:  Depiction of research framework and implications 
 
CONCLUSION 
The development of policies and programs to improve cybersecurity practices depends largely on our ability to obtain a 
comprehensive understanding of how individuals perceive cybersecurity threats and on how individual react to various 
influences such as sanctions and organizational communications, such as fear appeals.  Therefore, the purpose of this study is 
to collect data from computer users related to how they perceive cybersecurity threats both inside and outside of the 
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workplace, how they perceive the impact of sanctions, and how other factors may influence their overall cognitive processes 
in the cybersecurity context.  The proposed model enables us to better understand human behavior as it relates to 
cybersecurity and develop practices that will help secure businesses against internal security threats.  
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